ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
The setting is Valhalla--a hall in heaven reserved for great warriors. Odin, the Supreme God of gods and men, has assembled Napoleon and his Great Captains to formulate a tribunal in selecting additional great captains.
Enters General William Tecumseh Sherman, who will be reviewed by the tribunal.
This study reviews the criteria for a Great Captain and assesses General Sherman's qualifications for admission to Valhalla. 1. Offensive Action Essential to Positive Combat Results. Addressed also as a principle of war, the offense is essential to winning, even in cases where a defensive posture or strategy, such as with the Confederacy in the American Civil War, seems best indicated.
2.
Defensive StrenQth is Greater than Offensive Strength. While not listed as a principle of war, the commander who is unaware of this truth will need to be very lucky if he is going to have any kind of longevity.
Clausewitz stated that the "Defense is the stronger form of combat."
A military force that takes of advantage of terrain and fortifications, however hasty or well prepared, will require the attacker to use a preponderance of combat power if the offense is to be a success.
3.
Defensive Posture is Necessary when Successful Offense is Impossible.
Similar to economy of force, this principle recognizes that a commander who is opposed by a more powerful force has no choice but to assume a defensive posture, thus partially redressing the imbalance of forces.
He is thus able to slow the advance of the enemy, and possibly beat him or wear him down so that he may regain relative superiority and thus assume the offense and obtain positive combat results.
4.
Flank or Rear Attack is more likely to Succeed than Frontal Attack.
Somewhat analogous to Surprise, this principle of an indirect approach is applicable to all field operations and has been around since antiquity.
5.
Initiative Permits Application of Preponderant Combat Power.
Seizing and maintaining the initiative has been the key of all the Great Captains of history.
Initiative combines the principles of Mass and Offense.
6. Defender's Chances of Success are Directly Proportional to Fortification Strength.
Never in history has a defensive force been weakened by the use of fortifications. All fortifications can be overcome, but only if the enemy is willing to make a massive and costly effort (or they may be by-passed as in the case of the Maginot Line).
Fortifications are intended to obstruct, to permit the defender to punish the attacker, and to delay.
7.
An Attacker Willing to Pay the Price Can Always Penetrate the Strongest Defenses.
No matter how skillful the defender, despite his defensive ability and his use of interior lines, a skillful attacker can always achieve a temporary advantage at a place and time of his choosing.
(A classic example of this is Grant vs. Lee in the Virginia Campaign of 1864--while a Union victory was not always achieved, Lee was invariably forced to retreat until he could impose another temporary stalemate with the assistance of fortifications.)
8.
Successful Defense Reguires Depth and Reserves. In many of history's great battles, the side with the last reserves has won, such as at Waterloo and Antietam.
The Battle of Kursk during World War II is a classic example of the successful use of both Depth and Reserve.
9.
Superior Strength Always Wins. God has always been on the side of the biggest battalions--even in battles when the seemingly weaker side has prevailed; such advantages as surprise, terrain, the defense, etc., have provided them with a superior strength. (14) 10. Surprise Substantially Enhances Combat Power. Surprise is one of the most important principles of war.
11. Firepower Kills. Disrupts, Suppresses, and Causes Dispersion.
This corollary is hard to refute. But firepower should not be equated with lethality.
12. Combat Activities are Slower, Less Productive, and Less Efficient than Anticipated.
Clausewitz called it "friction in war," some the "fog of battle." The old Murphy's Law asserts that "what can go wrong will go wrong."
No matter how good peacetime field tests and exercises, inefficiency must always be considered.
13. Combat is too Complex to be Described in a Single, Simple Aphorism.
Any analysis or lessons drawn must be evaluated in the realities of war--all aspects, as above, must be considered--as well as the brutal, multifarious nature of combat.' As Napoleon pauses, the tribunal members cease their murmurs. Napoleon continues, "'As can be seen, many of the above The historian of the future will note his shortcomings. Not captiously, but in the kind of spirit of impartial justice he will set them down to draw the perfect balance of his character.
Let him deduct them from the qualities that mark his distinction, and we shall still see WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN looming up a superb and colossal figure in the generation in which he lived. There is much in this work on Great Captains, especially in defeat.
Recommended to any one interested in studying the Great Captains.
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Napoleon further lists Alexander as conducting eight campaigns, Hannibal 17, Caesar 13, Gustavus Adolphus commanded 3, Turenne in 18, Eugene 13, and Frederick 11.
12.
Dr. Jay Luvaas, interview by author, USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 9 February 1993.
The establishment of criteria for a "Great Captain" presents a problem for modern soldiers.
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